

EXHIBIT NO. 164

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

1 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON

At the hearing on January 25, 1946, Congressman Murphy asked to see the reports of the attack on Oahu which were sent to Washington by General Short and his subordinates. (Tr. 83¹2, 8346). The originals of those reports were shown to Congressman Murphy the same day, and copies are enclosed herewith.

*Carl R. Nelson*CARL R. NELSON
Captain, AUS

057A

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 1441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

DEC 7 1941

U R G E N T

2 5 P M

From: LT. SULLIVAN

To: ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished as follows:

1057 DECEMBER SEVENTH
JAPANESE HEAVY BOMBERS OPERATED IN THE SIGHT
ATTACKED HICKAM FIELD THE LEE FIELD AND
REPT. 23. STOP EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO A LEAD THE
WHEELER FIELD THREE HANGARS HIKARI FIELD AND
CAUGHT ON GROUND STOP DETAILS NOT YET
LASTED OVER ONE HOUR STOP UNCONFIRMED THAT
IN PEARL HARBOR BADLY DAMAGED WITH
ALSO BADLY DAMAGED STOP MORE DETAILS LATER

SHORT

ACTION COPY NO. 1 to W.D.

INF. COPY NO. 2 to Chief of Army Air Forces

INF. COPY NO. 3 to Secretary of General Staff

INF. COPY NO. 4 to J.C. of S. 5-1

INF. COPY NO. 5 to J.C. of S. 6-2

INF. COPY NO. 6 to J.C. of S. 7-3

INF. COPY NO. 7 to J.C. of S. 8-4

Action Copy

Vertical text on the left margin, possibly a routing slip or administrative note, partially obscured and difficult to read.

Large handwritten scribbles and signatures on the right side of the page, including what appears to be a signature and some illegible notes.

P 5WTC
1111A/7

RADIOGRAM

0-6-C

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

URGENT

DECEMBER 7, 1941

447 P M.

From PARA II

To AGC

Copies furnished as noted.

No. 1060, 7th

BATTLE CASUALTIES REPORTED TEN TWENTY AM SEVEN DECEMBER NINETEEN
FORTY ONE KNOWN DEAD THIRTY EIGHT WOUNDED THREE HUNDRED SIXTY
SIX OF WHICH TWENTY TO FIFTY LAY DIE PERIOD ONE B DASH SEVENTEEN
PLANE FROM MAINLAND RAN INTO ATTACK THREE INJURED END

SHORT

The message of ...
...
... will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be
... to the Adjutant General without delay.

AG

RB/Bjs-1712.

War Department, A.G.O., December 7, 1941. - To: A.C. of S., G-1.
(Exact Copy)

Exact Action Copy To: A. C. of S., G-1, Copy No. 1.

Exact Information Copy To: A.C. of S., G-2, Copy No. 2.,
A.C. of S., G-3, Copy No. 3.,
A.C. of S., G-4, Copy No. 4.,
Secretary of the General Staff, Copy No. 5.,
Chief, Army Air Forces., Copy No. 6.,
WPD Copy No. 7.

copy destroyed by ...

Handwritten signatures and initials, including 'ehb' and '21'.

Action Copy

P7 WTJ
1206P

RADIOGRAM

0-4-C

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 7, 1941

536P M.

URGENT

From HAWAII

To ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished as used:
DEC - 7 1941



No. 1066, 7th

FOR G TWO ENEMY AIR ATTACK RESUMED ELEVEN AM MUCH LESS
INTENSE THAN FORMER ATTACKS PERIOD MANILA REPORTS NO OVERT
ACTS HAVE YET OCCURRED THERE SIGNED FIELDER.

SHORT

The message of HQ - 1247...
repeated. Only such extracts as are necessary
necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This
copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be
returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

Exact Action Copy To: G-2, Copy No. 1

- Exact Information Copy To: G-1, Copy No. 2.
- G-3, Copy No. 3.
- MPD, Copy No. 4.
- Secretary, General Staff, Copy No. 5.
- G-4, Copy No. 6.

Handwritten notes:
all...
Secretary
12-7-41

EHB/bjs-1712.

War Department, A.G.O., December 7, 1941. - To: G-2.
(Exact Copy)

Action Copy

~~FILE DEC 11 1941~~

LW
25, TJ 5P

RADIOGRAM

0-4-C

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 9, 1941.

1:02A M.

From FT SHAFTER,

To CHIEF OF STAFF.

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1077. DECEMBER 8TH.

RLURAD FIVE FOUR NAUGHT DASH EIGHT DECEMBER EIGHTH YESTERDAYS OPERATIONS CONSISTED OF HEAVY AIR ATTACKS PRINCIPALLY AGAINST PEARL HARBOR, HICKAM, WHEELER AND BELLOWS FIELDS SCATTERING BOMBS AT PORT SHAFTER, CAPITOL BUILDING AND GOVERNORS HOME. OUR LOSSES SEVERE IN AIRCRAFT. ENEMY LOSSES BELIEVED SMALL. ELEVEN PLANES BROUGHT DOWN BY ARMY. GROUND FORCES UNEMPAIRED. MORALE EXCELLENT. ALL TROOPS ON BATTLE POSITIONS WITH TWO DAYS OF FIRE AT POSITIONS. TOTAL LOSSES TWO HUNDRED KILLED THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FIVE WOUNDED VERY LARGELY AT HICKAM FIELD. STATUS OF AIRCRAFT AS FOLLOWS: PLANES AVAILABLE B EIGHTEEN NINE; B SEVENTEEN, NINE; A TWENTY, EIGHT; PURSUIT, FORTY ONE TOTAL SIXTY SEVEN. PLANES THAT CAN BE REPAIRED LOCALLY: B EIGHTEEN FOUR; B SEVENTEEN TWO; A TWENTY TWO; PURSUIT NINE TO SIXTEEN. PRIORITY FOR DESIRED ASSISTANCE: SIXTY HEAVY BOMBERS; TEN MILLION ROUNDS POINT FIFTY CALIBER AMMUNITION WITH LINKS REPEAT LINKS; TWO HUNDRED PURSUIT PLANES; THIRTY SIX DIVE BOMBERS. BOMBS AS FOLLOWS: TWO THOUSAND POUND BOMBS SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY; ELEVEN HUNDRED POUND BOMBS THREE

1837004
1837004
1837004
1837004

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 7441 Munitions Bldg Washington, D. C.

M.

From _____

To _____

SIA 2 OF HONOLULU NO. 1077-3TH.

Copies furnished as noted:

THIRTY; SIX HUNDRED POUND TOWNS SIX THOUSAND; THREE HUNDRED POUND HOWITZERS TEN THOUSAND. SPECIAL ATTENTION TO TRINITY AND SPANISH TANKS FOR B SEVENTEEN S. AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE FURNISHED WITH COMPLETE COMBAT CREWS AND WITH FULL COMBAT NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT. REQUIREMENTS FOR MACHINING TOOLS AND SHOP EQUIPMENT NOT YET DESIRED. PRELIMINARY SALVAGE REPORTS ARE FAVORABLE AS CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY OF NEW TOOLS HAD NOT YET BEEN INSTALLED IN HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT AND WERE NOT DAMAGED. SUBPARAGRAPH ONE HUNDRED FIFTY DASH THIRTY SEVEN MILLIMETER GUNS TO COMPLETE QUOTA. REPLACE ALL THREE INCH ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS WITH FIVE INCH TOTAL OF EIGHTY SIX. THREE INCH GUNS TO BE USED FOR OUTLYING ISLANDS. TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN POUND FIFTY CALIBER GUNS TO COMPLETE QUOTA. FORTY EIGHT DASH ONE NAUGHT FIVE OR SEVENTY FIVE M TWO GUNS TO COMPLETE ORGANIC EQUIPMENT AND PERMIT USE OF OLD BRITISH SEVENTY FIVE AND LEACH GUNS TO REPLACE THOSE SHIPPED TO PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. ONE BATTALION TANKS PREFERABLY MEDIUM ONE MICHIGAN BATTALION. THIRTY THREE HUNDRED NAUGHT DEFENSE TROOPS TO FILL TABLE OF ORGANIZATION. FIFTY HUNDRED FIVE ARTILLERY TO FILL DIVISIONAL

Action Copy

REPRODUCED BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AT COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

_____ M.

From _____

To _____
SHEET #3 OF HONOLULU NO. 1077-8TH.

Copies furnished as noted:

ARTILLERY. AUTHORITY TO EVACUATE ALL DEPENDENTS AT
GOVERNMENT EXPENSE AND TO CRATE AND SHIP FURNITURE. WAR
DEPARTMENT TO PUSH FOOD STORAGE FOR CIVILIAN POPULATION;
INVENTORY IS BEING MADE RESULT COMMUNICATED AS SOON AS
KNOWN. RATIONING OF GASOLINE HAS BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT
TODAY. TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY JAPANESE AGENTS ARE UNDER
ARREST, FIFTY ADDITIONAL TO BE APPREHENDED. ONE HUNDRED
AND THIRTY TWO GERMANS AND ITALIANS ARE BEING ARRESTED.
ONE J. PANESE NAVAL OFFICER PRISONER OF WAR. THIRTY
JAPANESE AMATEUR RADIO STATIONS HAVE BEEN CLOSED.

SHORT.

SECRET. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

Action Copy

P 46 WTJ
223P/9

RADIOGRAM

1-4-C

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DEC. 10, 1941

PRIORITY

629 A M.

From HAWAII

To AGO

Copies furnished as noted:

DEC 10 1941



NO. 1098, 9TH

AGE SEVEN DECEMBER FOLLOWING SUMMARY BATTLE CASUALTIES
ENLISTED MEN FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION COLON
DEAD IDENTIFIED ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX NOT IDENTIFIED
SEVENTY FOUR MISSING TWENTY WOUNDED ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY FOUR.

46 A G O

DEC 10 1941

Received

SHORT

EXACT ACTION COPY TO: A.C. of S., G-2, Copy No. 1*

EXACT INFORMATION COPY TO: Sec. Genl. Staff, Copy No. 2.

A.C. of S., WFD, Copy No. 3.

A.C. of S., G-1, Copy No. 4*

Chief, Army Air Forces, Copy No. 5.

PRPH INF CY TO: Chief of Staff, SHQ.

copy destroyed by burning

*withd. G-1
withd. G-2
withd. G-3
withd. G-4
withd. G-5
L.P. 1706*

The marking of an exact copy is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be returned to the Adjutant General without delay.

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RADIOGRAM

0-4-C

P14 WTJ

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington D. C.

103 PM

DECEMBER 10 1941

PRIORITY

816 P M.

From: FT SHAFTER TH

To: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished as noted:
DEC 10 1941



1105 DECEMBER TENTH

FOR GENERAL ARNOLD STOP PURSUIT PLANES WERE DISPERSED TO
VARIOUS FIELDS ON OAHU STOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
INDICATED THAT SABOTAGE WAS MORE PROBABLE THAN ATTACK
AND TO FACILITATE ANTI SABOTAGE MEASURES PLANES WERE NOT DIS-
PERSERD AROUND PURSUIT FIELDS STOP LAST FEBRUARY FUNDS WERE
REQUESTED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF BUNKERS AND NECESSARY
TAXIWAYS TO PERMIT DISPERSAL OF PLANES AT NICKAM FIELD
STOP FUNDS HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED AT TIME OF ATTACK STOP
WE ARE NOW RUSHING CONSTRUCTION OF THESE DISPERSAL
FACILITIES AT NICKAM FIELD ALSO AT MASI AIRPORT AND AT
OTHER FIELDS.

SHORT

This making of an exact copy of this message is
prohibited. Only such extracts as are absolutely
necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This
copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will
be returned to the Adjutant General without delay.

47 AGO
DEC 10 1941
Copy destroyed by [unclear]
w/d and [unclear]
EXACT ACTION COPY TO: Chief, Army Air Forces, Copy No. 1
EXACT INFO COPY TO: C. of S., 2-2, Copy No. 2
C. of S., WPD, Copy No. 3
Secretary, General Staff, Copy No. 4
DEC 14 1941
11/35/112-10

Action Copy

FO 1-7-41

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER
FORT SHAFTER, H. I.

12 December 1941

12 Dec 41

TO: Chief of Staff of the Army.

FROM: The Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

1. On December 17, 1941, at 3:15 P. M., due to the knowledge of the situation reported by the Chief of Staff from Washington to the Department Commander, Alert #1 was directed. This alert as set forth in the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department requires all vital installations to be protected against sabotage throughout Oahu. Within an hour thereafter the entire command was in position and bridges, light plants, water pumping stations, and many other installations considered vital were being guarded for 24 hours a day. This protection, however, required only a small percentage of the troops, the remainder continuing the normal training. This alert did not require the dispersion of our airplanes on the field in order to avoid damage from saboteurs would be more simple if the planes were dispersed if they were all as loaded on the mats and in the hangars.

2. Alert #1, as above, was in effect at 7:55 A. M. on December 7, 1941, when the attack by an estimated one hundred and fifty Japanese planes on the Army and Navy installations on this Island.

3. The installations of the Aircraft Warning Company, a total of 12 permanent stations and six mobile, had not been completed as December 7, 1941, although every effort was being made to install these warning stations. A complete interceptor service, including all mobile stations, was operating from 4:00 A. M. to 7:00 A. M., which was the normal practice for Alert #1. The interceptor service closed down at 7:00 A. M. as no intercepts were reported. The Oahu mobile station, however, continued in operation to provide a record for further training. The noncommissioned officer in charge of the mobile station while the sole operator of the Aircraft Warning Information Center at 7:00 A. M. was informed that there was a large number of planes approaching from the direction North 2 points East at a distance of 132 miles. At that time there was only one officer at the Information Center. This officer was in contact with the Oahu station regarding the situation. A Naval officer was also in contact for the purpose of checking whether this flight was one of the fighters which was operating in the North, or one of the Army fighters operating from the West Coast, he reported this to be primarily fighters, and that they were not at the military airport. If it is of the enemy type, the information on a large attack. Also mention was made of the incident.

SECRET

4. When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire was opened, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few moments the real attack was not realized. The Chief of Staff then ordered and obeyed after the start of the attack. Chief of Staff ran into my quarters and directed that all troops be alerted. I immediately ordered that I direct him to turn out all troops under Alert #3. This Alert required all troops to occupy their battle positions in the shortest possible time and defend them in their mission. This order was carried out as rapidly as possible under the circumstances and troops from all echelons moved promptly to their battle positions. The Advance CP of the Department was operating in the Alimamu Crater by 8:45 A.M. with limited personnel, and the Advance CP of the 25th Division, of the Hawaiian Air Force, and complete personnel of Advance CP of Department Headquarters by 11:00 A.M. Rear echelons remained at their normal locations.

5. Three distinct attacks were made during the morning, the first one coming at 7:55 A.M., the second about 9:00 A.M., and the third about 11:00 A.M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. From a military standpoint the attack had been thoroughly planned and was almost faultlessly executed. Military objectives were successfully attacked with sufficient strength to bring about maximum destruction. In the Army, the airfields, the planes on the ground and the installations at the fields were the first objective. There were a few scattering bombs dropped at Fort Shafter and Fort Armstrong, these being sufficient to indicate that these two posts were also included as military objectives.

6. The largest number of planes concentrated on Pearl Harbor, and there each battleship, cruiser, and group of destroyers was given particular attention by a definite group of planes. Throughout there was every indication that the entire attack had been most carefully planned and every pilot knew exactly the part his plane was to play. There was very little evidence of any hit or miss bombing. From maps recovered from crashed planes, it was indicated that the pilots bombing Pearl Harbor knew the location of practically every ship, including exactly what type the ship was and where it was berthed. There was indication that each plane had been armed to execute its particular task. Enclosure No. 1 attached sets forth the type of planes identified and their general characteristics. It is believed that all planes came from carriers. The most serious damage to battleships was caused by torpedo planes.

7. The damage, as far as the Army was concerned, was chiefly at Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Bellows Field; Hickam Field suffering the greatest number of casualties and materiel losses. At Hickam Field the Hawaiian Air Depot was completely destroyed. Many of the bombers were wrecked on the ground and three hangars were burned. The mess hall and barracks were severely damaged, and the Post Exchange building was wrecked.

8. Wheeler Field suffered the second greatest amount of damage in hangars and personnel, and in actual numbers the greatest loss in planes.

SECRET

9. Hickam Field suffered the least. However, two pilots were killed here and one squadron of P-40s lost all but two planes. At Waikiki and Ardenmore there were no casualties nor any material damaged.

10. By noon on Sunday the situation was becoming somewhat normal. However, the civilian population was just realizing what had happened and roads were becoming jammed with traffic going in every direction. The Honolulu Rapid Transit Company, which operates a large number of busses and has by far the largest franchise in the City of Honolulu, under the direction of Mr. Kirk and his Civilian Relief Committee immediately moved into Hickam Field, Fort Kamehameha, and started evacuating families from these areas. All during Sunday afternoon and the following day this evacuation of families continued, the bulk of the families being quartered in schools and homes throughout the City. At Fort Shafter, where the headquarters of the Interceptor Command is being constructed in a spur of the Koolau mountains, the women and children of Fort Shafter and a few from Schofield Barracks were accommodated. Some confusion resulted in this initial evacuation. However, within 48 hours most of the difficulties were eliminated and the system was functioning in an efficient, highly satisfactory manner. slit trenches were being dug by the Station Complements at all the posts in the immediate vicinity of quarters so that when the families returned to their quarters they would have some protection in case of actual raid by jumping into these trenches. Slit trenches are also being constructed in all parks, school grounds, and open places accessible to civil communities.

11. Prior to this time all Japanese Agents, as well as Italian and German, had been listed by the Army G-2, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Naval Intelligence. Hence it was but a matter of a few hours until the Japanese Agents were being herded and assembled in the Immigration Station, which had been selected as a site heretofore. At present they are all assembled in the Quarantine Station on Sand Island, the total being as follows:

Japanese	-	370
German	-	98
Italian	-	14
Total	-	482.

There has been no difficulty, either at the time of apprehension or later during the period of confinement of these enemy agents. In the beginning the Department Military Police and Civilian Police constituted the guard. Later a rifle company of the 25th Division was employed. A special detachment is now being organized under the Provost Marshal for the guarding of the entire group. Under the Standing Operating Procedure the Commanding General, 25th Division, is made responsible for guarding of vital installations within the South Sector. However, within the next week the entire Police District #1, which includes the City of Honolulu, will be taken over by the Hawaiian Territorial Guard, under the direction of the Department Provost Marshal. This will relieve approximately six companies of Infantry for combat duty.

SECRET

12. The casualty report of 10 December 1941, is attached as Inclosure No. 2. The 24 hours following the submission of this report has changed the figures in but one respect, adding four to the total known dead and subtracting four from the seriously wounded.

13. Since 11:00 A.M. on 7 December 1941, there have been no attacks. A landing was not attempted, either from small boats, by air borne troops or by parachute troops, although during Monday and Tuesday there was much information and many erroneous reports received at the Department CP. We have been unable to determine whether these reports were submitted by additional enemy agents or by imaginative individuals. The Army has one prisoner of war, a Naval Lieutenant, who swam ashore from a two-man submarine, which became stranded on a reef near Kaneohe Bay. A submarine of this same type was sunk by the Navy at about 7:15 Sunday morning within Pearl Harbor, after it was believed it had attacked the Raleigh. Very little information was obtained by G-2 from this prisoner. He apologized for his ignorance in navigating and stated that he expected and wanted to be shot as a result of his failure. This submarine was towed ashore and is now being examined by both the Army and the Navy. Some equipment was found intact in the planes that were shot down. In most cases this equipment, as well as the planes, engines, etc., appeared to be excellent for the purpose for which it was intended. Occupants of all planes were dead when found. The Army shot down a total of eleven planes by pursuit planes and by anti-aircraft.

14. Martial Law was declared on December 8th and all functions of the Military Government were initiated, with the Department Commander as Military Governor and the Department Judge Advocate General in actual charge as Executive. The cooperation of the civilian population, in view of this great change in their Government, has generally been excellent. Whether difficulties will arise in the future remains to be seen. However, all indications point to a general acceptance of this situation by the civilian population.

15. Approximately three weeks prior to the outbreak of hostilities, detachments from the 804th Engineers, reinforced by large groups of civilian engineers, departed from Honolulu on specially chartered vessels for Christmas and Canton Islands for the purpose of constructing airfields on these Islands by January 15th. Additional fields were being constructed or already established fields were being expanded in the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia and at Townsville, Australia. All of this work was directly under the Department Commander, with the District Engineer acting as his immediate representative. According to local agreement the Army was responsible for the defense of Christmas Island and the Navy assumed the responsibility for Canton Island. This was later changed on account of instructions from the War Department before the Navy had placed any of their defense forces on Canton Island. Defense forces were to have been dispatched to Canton Island December 9th but were interrupted by the state of war. To date there has been no delay in their construction and the supplying of these outlying projects are being continued. It is felt, however, that certain modifications must be made

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

for the sake of safety. The Ludington on December 8th was en route from Christmas to Canton carrying 1500 tons of equipment for Canton, including a large still to guarantee a water supply. On orders from Washington the Navy, for purposes of safety, diverted the Ludington from Canton to Samoa. Canton is very close to points where the Japanese are operating and the Navy feels that it will be impossible to protect it at this time.

Also, the water situation in a short time could be serious if the 300 civilians now there remain. The decision was made yesterday to send the Haleakala from here to Canton to take all civilians to Christmas to be employed upon the works there. The dredge and tugs were started yesterday from Canton to Christmas as the position was too exposed to leave these boats there. Two 75mm guns, 6 Browning automatic rifles, and 6 water-cooled machine guns, all with antiaircraft mounts, are being sent on the Valcakala to reinforce the garrison at Canton, consisting of 45 Engineers, Medical and Signal Detachments. A detachment of ten Field Artillery is being sent to operate the 75mm guns. If approved by the Chief of Staff, this garrison will remain on the Island. There is available food for a period of six months. There are a good many thousands of gallons of water in storage and two stills in operation capable of producing 1,000 gallons of water per day. There is no harbor at Canton and it is impossible for anything but small boats or lighters drawing about eight feet to enter the harbor. By providing proper underground facilities it is believed that this garrison can remain at Canton and defend itself indefinitely. All engineer equipment, gasoline, oil, explosives, etc. are being left at Canton and work will proceed with a limited number of men available. With the increase in the number of civilians at Christmas work should go along much faster there. If Christmas and the field at Nandi, near Suva in the Fiji Islands, are completed by January 15th it will be possible to use this route without either Canton or Samoa. The advisability of moving the civilians from Canton to Samoa was considered but the Navy did not want them at Samoa. The machinery on the Ludington now at Samoa can be used to very great advantage at Nandi and the War Department is being requested to authorize the Ludington to unload this at Suva when the first convoy proceeds to the Philippine Islands. The work at Christmas, Nandi, and Townsville will be pushed to the maximum as the necessity for this additional air route to the Orient is more apparent now than ever before, particularly since Midway and Wake are being attacked and Guam is reported to be in the hands of the Japanese.

16. Today nine B-17s have arrived safely from the mainland, making a total of 23 now available in the Department with the possibility of repairing two more. There are 11 B-12s and 9 A-20s left, with 52 P-40s, ^{Pursuit} more P-40s and heavy bombers will be required before a sense of security is possible. This is particularly true in view of the severe losses which have been suffered by the Navy.

17. The ground troops in the Department have suffered no losses. Morale is high and a state of training throughout is perhaps the highest it has been for many years. Reinforcements, however, are highly essential, in air force, fillers for harbor defense units, field artillery, as well as the infantry regiments in both divisions. Antiaircraft artillery which is due to arrive in January and March should be sent at once. A battalion of tanks and a signal

SECRET

battalion are most essential. Two additional infantry regiments should be made available in order to provide any reserve which is worthy of the name. Our tactical problem here is one of strong field fortifications prepared for occupation, held lightly with large reserves prepared to move by motor at an instant's notice. Counter-attacks are automatic. With the additional planes to be received much greater use will be made of the airfields on the outlying islands in order to gain dispersion and security. The 299th Infantry is now garrisoning Hawaii, Maui, Oahu and Molokai. Each airfield has two 75mm guns, and four 3-inch antiaircraft model 1918 guns are being sent to reinforce these troops. If 5-inch antiaircraft guns are received for use on Oahu these anti-aircraft positions will be completed. All troops on outlying islands have a considerable number of machine guns in addition to their organic equipment.

18. It is of the utmost importance that a large supply of bombs and of .50 caliber ammunition should be sent to Honolulu at once. Ammunition reserves of all classes should be brought to the prescribed amounts as rapidly as possible.

19. Salvaging operations have resulted in the reclaiming of heavy tools and equipment at the airfields to the extent that we now have in condition over 80% of all machine equipment. This has resulted in being able to recommission many of the planes which were badly cracked. These recommissioned planes are included in the total shown in the above paragraph. There was practically no damage to existing runways at the various airfields. The airfields, particularly the extension of runways to a minimum of 5,000 feet to provide for their use by heavy bombers, is being pushed to the limit at all fields on Oahu and outlying islands. For example, 1,500 feet has been added to the length of the runway at Bellows Field since Sunday, and part of the B-17 squadron which arrived this morning landed on Bellows Field. By the middle of next week the field at Maui will be able to take any size planes. The only approximately 100 bunkers for our air planes at Bellows Field had been completed by the 20th engineers. However, the construction of bunkers for heavy bombers at Bellows, in the general, could not be done by the light equipment of the engineers' troops, so it is a contractor's job. We have been attempting to make search for this purpose but have not succeeded. We are well under way now.

20. For many months I have been attempting to complete field fortifications which could not be completed without material for paving and splinter-proofing. I have been told repeatedly by the War Department that no funds could be made available for this purpose. We had carried the fortifications through as far as could without this material. All field fortifications are now being carried to completion at an extremely rapid rate. Essential trails and military roads are being pushed rapidly. Evacuation camps for both civilians and military dependents are being constructed.

All military dependents will be sent home as rapidly as transportation becomes available.

10

10

REPORT

1. This report covers the details of the action of the Aircraft Control Personnel and the Control Officer at Wheeler Field in connection with the flight of enemy planes as plotted by the O'Garra Report from the Service Stations.

Index:

- 1. Summary Report - Wheeler Field
- 2. Report of Personnel
- 3. Report of Control Officer
- 4. Appendix

Walter C. Murphy

WALTER C. MURPHY
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

- 2 -

1000

SECRET

Enemy Aircraft believed used in air raid 7 December 1941.

1. Fighter 97 Nakajima.
 - a. Nonretractible landing gear.
 - b. Low wing, blunt nose.
 - c. Single seat.
 - d. Three machine guns, two in wings, 500 rounds per gun.
 - e. Sea level speed 240 miles per hour, maximum.
2. Fighter Mitsubishi.
 - a. Two 20mm cannon fires from wings; two machine guns fire through propellor.
 - b. 550 pound bomb load.
 - c. Speed 275 miles per hour, minimum.
 - d. Maximum range (?)
- * 3. Bomber Kawasaki Type Observation and Light Bomber Type 97 - uses also Diesel motor - (One shot down with Diesel motor near Wahiawa.)
 - a. Dihedral (slight positive).
 - b. Low wing monoplane.
 - c. Three machine guns - bomb load 661.3 pounds - 300 kgm.
 - d. Speed 217.4 miles per hour, maximum.
4. Dive bomber 97 (referred to sometimes as Deck Type Reconnaissance).
 - a. Low wing monoplane.
 - b. Retractable landing gear.
 - c. Single strut.
 - d. Three in crew (Pilot, 2d Pilot and radioman).
 - e. Speed sea level 200 miles per hour, maximum.
5. Torpedo Plane.
 - a. No description in F.L. Appeared larger than other enemy aircraft; low wing, carried one torpedo directly under fuselage.
- * 6. Type 0-1 Fighter (Mitsubishi) .
 - a. Ship board fighter.
 - b. All metal low wing, internally braced.
 - c. Fully retractible landing gear.
 - d. Flush rivetting.
 - e. Two 20mm cannons; each wing; two 7.7 machine guns in fuselage. No armor.
 - f. Floating gear and arresting gear. (This ship at HAD).
7. Aichi Clock Type
 - a. Ship board bomber.
 - b. Two seater.
 - c. Internally braced.
 - d. Wings from oval plan.
 - e. All metal except wing tip which is wood.
 - f. Semi-retractible gear.
 - g. Kinsei engine, model 44, twin row radial air cooled.

Page 1, Incl. #1.

22

SECRET

- h. Weight empty 2328.
- i. Useful load 1272.
- j. Loaded 3660 (over all).
- k. Believe bomb at 550 pounds.
- l. No armor apparently.
- m. Two fixed guns fuselage.
- n. Flexible gun rear cockpit caliber 7.7.
(In possession Navy).

*Indicates type of ship according to F.M., July 1941, one of each was shot down and is in possession of Army or Navy.

Report of Casualties.

1. The following data reference battle casualties from midnight 6 December 1941 to midnight 9 December 1941 is hereby submitted.

	<u>T. G. H.</u>	<u>SCRO</u>	<u>Hickam</u>	<u>Total</u>
(a) Number of patients in hospital prior to midnight 6 December 1941.	456	531	29	1016
(b) Admissions:				
1. Battle casualties (seriously and slightly wounded).	378	118	26	472
2. Other than battle casualties	10	44	2	56
3. Number dead upon arrival at Hospital	152	27	0	159
4. Number died after admission.	(10)	(11)	(0)	(21)
(c) Dispositions:				
1. Battle casualties to duty.	0	44	12	56
2. All others.	127	228	23	498
(d) Total number of beds vacant.	614	548	38	1200
(e) Total known dead.	142	38	0	224x
(f) Total seriously wounded.	75	38	1	114
(g) Total slightly wounded	253	80	25	358
(h) Total Battle Casualties - - - - -				696

x This includes 44 dead bodies taken direct to the morgue.

Final #2

Fort Shafter, T. H.)
Territory of Hawaii)

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned,
; as authority for administering oaths of this nature, one
Grover C. White, Jr. 6-296182, 2nd Lieut., Signal
Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who
after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWE agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A.M. to 6 P.M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A.M. to 4 P.M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A.M. to 11 A.M. and to have "staggered" operation, i.e., 3 stations from 11 A.M. to 1 P.M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P.M. to 4 P.M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCANN, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received by the AWE Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M.

3. At approximately 7:30 A.M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCANN, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A.M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Steuffer, SCANN, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P.M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

Grover C. White, Jr.
GROVER C. WHITE, JR.,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Incl.
Statement by Pfc. Joseph McDonald *att*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec A.D. 1941

at Fort Shafter, T. H.

Adam R. Huggins
ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

Fort Shafter, T. H.)

Territory of Hawaii)

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt 1cl, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A.M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockard at the Opana Station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

P. J. C. Joseph P. McDonald

Joseph P. McDonald,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of December A.D. 1941
at Fort Shafter, T. H.

Adam R. Huggins
ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

0-4-

74 77 J

4:10 P M FILED

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg. Washington, D. C.

DEC 19 1941

100 4 1.

From FT SHAFER, HAWAII

To THE JUDGE

Copies furnished as noted:

ONE TWO THREE FIVE EIGHTEENTH
 FOR G TWO REFRAD SIOY NIATN ONE SEVENTEENTH TO EIGHT
 EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT EITHER COMPREHENSIVE OR RELIABLE
 PERIOD STEPS WERE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO ASSEMBLE A AVAIL-
 ABLE INFORMATION AND AS RECEIVED WAS SENT YOU WITH
 TECHNICAL DATA TO ARMY AIR FORCE PERIOD PARA TACTICS
 USED COLON ALL TARGETS STRUCK ZASTICALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY
 PERIOD PRIMARY OBJECTIVE PEARL HARBOR AND HIGHMAN FIELD
 COMMA RECORDED AS SINGLE OBJECTIVE PERIOD SECONDARY
 OBJECTIVE WHEELER FIELD AND OTHER AIR WITNESSES PERIOD
 BOMBERS ATTACKED TARGETS FROM ALL DIRECTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY
 COMMA INITIATING DIVE OF FORTY FIVE TO SIXTY DE-
 GREES FROM ALTITUDE OF THREE TO FIVE THOUSAND FEET AND
 CONTINUED DIVE ALMOST TO TARGETS PERIOD HIGH ALTITUDE
 BOMBERS FLEW IN VEE FORMATION INDIVIDUAL PLANES IN FOR-
 MATION SEPARATED BY ABOUT TWO PLANE WIDTHS
 TWELVE TO FIFTEEN PLANES IN FORMATION AND RELEASED
 BOMBS IN FORMATION FROM ALTITUDES ESTIMATED AT FROM
 EIGHT TO TWELVE THOUSAND FEET PERIOD DIVE BOMBING AND
 HIGH ALTITUDE ATTACKS CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY PERIOD
 LIVE BOMBERS GIVEN CLOSE SUPPORT BY SUPPORT PERIOD
 REPORT OF CLOSE SUPPORT BY SUPPORT PERIOD

Actual Copy

Report of the Operations Management Committee
 Pearl Harbor, December 18, 1941

M.

ONE TWO THREE FIVE DECEMBER 18 PAGE TWO
 PERIOD APPEARS NOW HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBERS EMPLOYED
 ONLY AGAINST PEARL HARBOR DASH HICKAM AREA PERIOD HAVING
 EMPLOYED BOMBS DIVE BOMBERS EMPLOYED MACHINE GUNS AGAINST
 AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AND AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL PERIOD ACQ-
 QUIESCENT FIELD IT APPEARS ENEMY RELIED PRINCIPALLY UPON
 COMPLETE POW DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT COMMA BOMBS BEING
 EMPLOYED AGAINST BUILDINGS PARA UNABLE AT THIS TIME TO
 ESTIMATE TOTAL NUMBER PLANES EMPLOYED NOR TO STATE NUMBER
 OF COMBATS UTILIZED COMMA ALTHOUGH APPEARS ALMOST CERTAIN
 AT LEAST THREE COMBAT PERIOD NO NOVELTIES
 EITHER IN EQUIPMENT OR TACTICS INTRODUCED PERIOD SUCCESS
 OF ATTACK DUE TO CAREFUL PLANNING AND PREPARATION COMMA
 COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECTIVE COMMA SURPRISE COMMA AND
 DETERMINATION WITH WHICH

THIS PART BEING SERVICED.

TORPEDO BOMBS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED PERIOD TYPE ZERO
 PERIOD HAD TWO TWENTY MILLIMETER GANNON IN WINGS AND TWO
 SEVEN POINT SEVEN MACHINE GUNS FIRING THROUGH PROPELLER
 PERIOD DIVE BOMBER HAD TWO SEVEN POINT SEVEN MACHINE GUNS
 FIRING THROUGH PROPELLER AND ONE SEVEN POINT SEVEN

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

_____ M.

From _____

To _____

Comms furnished as noted:

DEC 19 1941



ONE TWO THREE FIVE DECEMBER 18 PAGE THREE
FLEXIBLE GUN IN REAR COCKPIT PERIOD FRAGMENTATION AND
DEMOLITION BOMBS WERE EMPLOYED BY DIVE BOMBERS PRESENT
INFORMATION INDICATING NO BOMBS LARGER THAN ABOUT FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY POUNDS USED BY THIS TYPE PERIOD HIGH ALTI-
TITUDE BOMBERS REPORTED TO HAVE UTILIZED CONVERTED FIFTEEN
INCH SHELL COMMA EVIDENT PURPOSE TO SECURE PENETRATION
PERIOD CHARACTERISTICS OF TORPEDOES NOT KNOWN AT THIS
TIME PERIOD REPORTS THAT TWO MOTOR PLANERS USED NOT
POSITIVELY CONFIRMED SIGHTED FIELDER

EMOTE

EXCERPT COPY TO: Sec. of S., G.E., (L.S.)

SECY, (S.), (S.), (S.), (S.)

SECY, (S.), (S.), (S.), (S.)

SECY, (S.), (S.), (S.), (S.)

[Handwritten notes and signatures]

[Handwritten notes and signatures]

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY

Received at the War Department
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

JANUARY 23, 1941

From: MEMPHIS, 147411

To: THE ASSISTANT C. En L.

Open/forwarded to whom.

19 341



PART FIVE 1255--DECEMBER 18

NEW EQUIPMENT COLON TYPE AIRCRAFT POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED COLON TYPE ZERO THREE SEVEN PURSUIT FIVE
PREVIOUS STATEMENT TO ARY AIR FORCE COL TYPE ZERO
ONE PURSUIT IN ORDER TAKEN AND TYPE NINE/ NINE DIVE
BOMBER PERIOD DIVE BOMBER IS CONVENTIONAL LOW FINE
SINGLE ENGINE TWO WATER MONOPLANE WITH FIXED LANDING
GEAR AND DIVING BRAKES PERIOD BOTH TYPES EQUIPPED WITH
LIFTING HOOKS FOR CARRIER OPERATION PERIOD NEITHER HI
ALTITUDE BOMBING PRESENT WAR

Only copy of
copy will be made and
it be safeguarded and
returned to The Assistant General will be at 3441.

- REACT ACTION COPY TO: *[Handwritten initials]* Cy. No. 1.
- TO: THE COPY TO: *[Handwritten initials]* Cy. No. 2.
- TO: THE COPY TO: *[Handwritten initials]* Cy. No. 3.
- TO: THE COPY TO: *[Handwritten initials]* Cy. No. 4.

[Handwritten signature]
Received
[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten initials]

Action C

POST OFFICE
4 TION FILE
PRIORITY

PRIORITY

9-4-C

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3461 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 22, 1941

7:58 A. M.

From HQ 11

To THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copies furnished as noted.

NO. 1342--PRIORITY
 INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ENEMY AIRBORNE BOMBING OF THE
 T. O. COLONEL OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES OF THE STATES
 AIRCRAFT CONSOLIDATED AIRFIELD, HICKAM FIELD, HAWAII, ON
 DECEMBER 21, 1941, AGAINST PEARL HARBOR, HONOLULU, HAWAII, BY
 AIRCRAFT DIRECTED AGAINST NAVAL VESSELS AND NAVAL
 INSTALLATIONS STOP INFORMATION NECESSARY TO RECONSTRUCT
 THE ENEMY OPERATION AGAINST OAHU NOT AT PRESENT IN
 THE POSSESSION OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES HERE STOP SUGGEST
 INFORMATION RELATIVE ENEMY ACTION AGAINST NAVAL OBJECTIVES
 BE OBTAINED FROM NAVY DEPARTMENT STOP AS TO ATTACKS AGAINST
 ARMY INSTALLATIONS CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN CONNECTION
 WITH THE FLYING BOMB ATTACKS WERE GREATLY LIMITED
 AND HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBING ATTACKS FOR ENEMY BOMBING
 AND AIRCRAFT SERVICE IN GENERAL AND RATIO OF THESE
 TO THE TOTAL ENEMY STOP AT PRESENT KNOWN STOP AS TO IN
 FORMATION INDICATED BY AIRCRAFT ONLY OBJECTIVE ATTACKED
 BY HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBING STOP HICKAM BOMBED FROM SIX
 TO SEVEN FEET OR HIGHER BY TWO FORMATIONS HORIZONTAL
 FORMATION CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE OR SIX PLANE
 FORMATION STOP TO THE PLANE STOP TYPE

Action Copy

RECEIVED 12-22-41 11:00 AM 1941

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

DEC 22 1941



GENERAL STAFF DIV., AGO.
7 P. M. 561118

NO. 1502 FROM HAWAII PAGE TWO
OF HIGH ALTITUDE HORIZONTAL BOMBERS NOT DEFINITELY
ESTABLISHED YET. ALL AVAILABLE AVAILABLE INFORMATION HAS
BEEN REPORTED TO CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCE'S STAFF BY CHIEF OF
EVIDENCE THAT ONLY SINGLE ENGINE PLANE WERE
EMPLOYED BY ENEMY STOP RUMORS OF PRESENCE OF ENEMY HIGH
ALTITUDE PLANE HAVE NOT BEEN INVESTIGATED
SIGNED TINKER END

EMONS

10
The making of an exact copy of this message is
forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely
necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This
copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be
returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

10
Chief, Army Air Forces, G-2, Copy No. 1.

10
Chief, Army Air Forces, G-2, Copy No. 2.

10
Chief, Army Air Forces, G-2, Copy No. 3.

10
Secretary Gen. Staff, Copy No. 1.

10
Indicated by handwriting
Indicated by handwriting

10
with & destroyed
by [unclear]
J. [unclear]

10
Copy

SECRET**SECRET**

AUX. C. G. RAW. DEPT

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.INITIALS *WMM*
DATE 21 DEC 1941

In reply refer to:

AG 370.2/36

21 December 1941.

Subject: Report of attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference your radio 682-15th of 17 December 1941, the report of air tactics was included in our radio 1302 this date.

2. The reports of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of the Interceptor Commandant and of the Operations Officer, Hickam Field are attached hereto as inclosures 1, 2, 3 & 4.

3. For the report of the then Commanding General, attention is invited to the "Report of the Battle of Oahu" dated 12 December 1941, by General Short and which has previously been forwarded to you.

For the Commanding General:

AG A G O

DEC 26 1941

Received

W. M. McCall
Major, A. G. D.
Assistant Adjutant General.

4 Incls

* 1 - Report of AC/S, G-2. (dup)
* 2 - Report of AC/S, G-3. (dup)

SUBJECT: Report of attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941.

AG 381(12-21-41)MSC

1st Ind.

AG 1-170

War Department, A.G.O., December 29, 1941. TO: Chief of Army Air Service

4 Incls. n/c

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

In reply refer to:

20 December 1941

SUBJECT: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941.
TO: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. The following facts have been gleaned from numerous reports of eye-witnesses and supplement or correct reports sent you by radio.

2. The enemy effort will be covered under three general headings: Hickam Field area; Wheeler Field Area; Bellows Field area.

a. HICKAM FIELD AREA: At 7:55 A.M., December 7, 1941, the first indication of an attack was 9 enemy single engine, low wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, which were observed southeast of Hickam Field Hanger line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet, and toward Pearl Harbor. They were in two echelons, 5 planes in the first and 4 in the second. This flight did not attack Hickam Field. At almost the same time, however, 9 dive bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hanger line from the South, and 3 additional planes attacked the same objectives from the Northwest. Several minutes later 9 additional dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hanger line from the Southeast. Immediately thereafter 7 additional dive bombers attacked the Hickam Field hanger line from the East.

All planes dived at approximately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3000 to 5000 feet. Bombs were released at about 1000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives from 800 feet to approximately 300 feet.

Machine-gun fire was employed before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about 10 minutes. This attack and subsequent ones were supported by fighter planes.

The second attack occurred at about 8:25 A.M., when between 6 and 9 planes approached from the south and attacked No. 1 Agua System, technical buildings immediately behind hanger lines and consolidated barracks. These planes when first observed were flying level and released bombs from level flight at altitude of about 150 feet. During and immediately after this bombing attack our planes on parking apron were attacked with gun fire. About one minute later (8:26) a formation of probably 5 or 6 planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude, evidently believing gasoline storage system to be in that area. The second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes.

enc #11

SECRET

Subject: Report of Bomb Attacks on Wheeler Field, 7 December 1941
 File: 16-48744, Sub. 100-10744, Washington

The third attack occurred about 1:00 p.m., 7 December 1941 (presumably these times had previously been used for flights of 170 feet at 1000) altitude. The formation consisted of 10 planes, 8 of which were dispersed along with machine gun fire. Three other came from four directions about 1000 feet. At the time was a formation of five 7 to 9 planes, flying in the direction of an altitude estimated at 3,000 feet, reported from the field, in line in line with a staggered formation, possibly from a low altitude exchange. The third attack lasted about 10 minutes, and was arriving from the mainland during this attack. All enemy planes observed at low altitudes were single engine, low wing, conventional type of high altitude bombers not definitely established. Language to be used believed not to exceed 500 yards. The formation was identified as 7.7 and 20 mm.

b. WHEELER FIELD AREA: At 8:00 A.M., Sunday, 7 December 1941, approximately 25 planes approached Wheeler Field, generally from the southeast, at about 5,000 feet altitude. They passed well to east of Wheeler Field, circles counter-clockwise, landing altitude and approached for attack from north at about 3,000 feet, generally perpendicular to the hangar line. The formation of the entire group was roughly a closed "V" - with 5 sections of 4 planes each forming the "V" formation, with a 4th plane extending the right leg of the "V". A single odd plane flew slightly to the rear of the formation. The attack dived at an angle of about 45 degrees from horizontal. The attack struck hangar line and vicinity over a length of about 300 yards, starting from the engineering hangar, which is at the extreme southeast of the hangar line. Bombs and machine gun fire were employed during dive bombing attack. Practically all bombs struck the hangar line and points in rear of the line and were released at altitudes of 200 and 250 feet. After releasing bombs the planes continued to dive for a short distance and pulled out at about same angle as start of dive. No evidence at Wheeler of bombs larger than 500 pounds.

After the first dive bombing the formation broke, apparently in all directions, with individual planes continuing gun fire, and without regard to possibility of collision. This phase of the attack was carried on from altitudes of approximately 200 feet and the only semblance of order appeared to be that planes circled counter-clockwise. Principal targets for this gun fire were our planes on hangar line and buildings and personnel in immediate vicinity. All planes in first attacking formation appeared similar externally and were single engine, low wing, conventional. While not positively established, it is presumed from evidence of 20 mm fire that this attack included fighters in support of dive bombers. The entire attack lasted approximately 15 minutes.

SECRET

Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd
To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington.

Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes after 9:00 A.M., same day. This attack consisted of 7 enemy planes which approached from the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of about 500 feet. They fired machine guns at planes being taxied onto the air-drome but it is believed that no plane fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven planes were single engine, low wing, monoplanes, two-seaters. They withdrew to the north. The whole second attack less than 5 minutes. This could very reasonably have been a group of planes expending the remainder of their ammunition.

c. BELLOWS FIELD AREA: The attack on Bellows Field was initiated by a single Japanese fighter plane at approximately 8:30 A.M., December 7th. He came directly from the sea (East) and employed machine-gun fire on the tent area apparently expending all his ammunition in this one attack.

At about 9:00 A.M., nine fighters attacked from the north in 3 groups of 3 planes each in "V" formation. This attack lasted about 15 minutes and consisted of gun fire only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all 9 planes, after which the 3 formations of 3 each peeled off and attacked from various directions.

After the single plane, tent-area attack, a B-17 which had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land at Hickam Field attempted to land at Bellows Field but rolled off the run-way. This plane was repeatedly machine-gunned by the 9 plane attack.

The attack at Bellows Field appeared well planned, rehearsed and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by Infantry troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the sea for identification purposes.

3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS & REMARKS: Strafing planes came down to a very low altitude in practically all cases. Some 50 to 60 feet from the ground. Strafers used 50 caliber, 7.7 cal. and 20 mm. The torpedo planes which were employed only against Pearl Harbor came in to sight flying very low and did not change altitude until torpedoes were dropped.

Rigid flight discipline was demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced. Such an attack could not have been performed without numerous and detailed rehearsals. Every movement seemed to have been rehearsed and was exceptionally well executed.

Liaison with battle force intelligence has been maintained but the general tactics of the enemy attack has not definitely been reconstructed.

A few bombs were dropped in Honolulu proper, but in all probability this resulted from individual planes clearing bomb racks before departing. A few bursts of machine gun fire were likewise delivered at targets other than military objectives.

SECRET

Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd
To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington.

4. CONCLUSION: It is impossible at this time to state how many planes or how many carriers were employed, but it is still believed that at least three carriers were involved. Likewise, it is impossible to definitely establish whether or not any planes returned to a carrier, re-loaded and participated in subsequent attacks. It is the opinion of this office that no planes did so. It is more probable that planes were launched from different carriers at different times or that different groups of planes were launched at staggered intervals. It has not been established from what direction or distance the carriers were when the planes were launched, although the Navy believes that at least one carrier operated from 150 miles north of Oahu. It is established that no land based planes were employed in the attack, and while many reports come in relative to enemy planes with more than one motor no positive identification of such planes has been established. It is believed that multi-motor planes reported were our own B-17's, a flight of which arrived from the mainland during the attacks.

Kendall J. Fielder
KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

In reply refer to:

20 December 1941

G-2 SECTION CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

7 Dec '41

At 0755, 7 December 1941, the Japanese Imperial Navy sent its airplanes over Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, Bellows Field, Wheeler Field, Schofield Barracks, Fort Kamehameha, other Army and Navy Installations and the City of Honolulu as well, in the opening blow in the present war between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, arrived in the G-2 Office in the headquarters building at Fort Shafter at 0803 and was followed at short intervals by other members of the section who came from all parts of the city. The section was in operation by 0830 although it handled a volume of messages prior to that time.

By 0830 the following subsections of the department G-2 were in full operation: Combat Intelligence, Public Relations, Administration, Army Contact Office (counter-subversive and counter-espionage).

Contact with the intelligence sections of the various posts in the Department was established by telephone beginning at 0815.

Immediate use of the radio stations in Honolulu, KGU and KQMB, was made by the section.

The first message put on the air by the section was that "Oahu has been subjected to a sporadic air raid. Do not drive on the streets or highways, keep off the streets."

The radios then warned people to get vehicles off streets, to remain calm, to keep off the telephones, to keep their radios on, and that there would be announcements in Japanese and Filipino and that they should not be alarmed if they heard a foreign language on the air.

All military and naval personnel were warned to return to their posts immediately.

Civilian and all other emergency workers who had been organized for disaster relief were ordered to their predesignated posts.

About 0830 it was announced to the press that the planes had been definitely identified as Japanese.

The War Department was advised by this section of preliminary details of the attack about 0850.

The Contact Office which had been operating on a 24 hour basis was instructed to take particular precautions to watch sabotage and internal disorders. All agents of the Contact Office were functioning at this time.

Liaison between the section and the office of the Director of Civilian Defense was established about this time.

Shortly thereafter Governor Poindexter declared the Territory in a state of emergency thereby placing the Territory's "M-Day" law into effect at 1000.

As various intelligence sections of the different posts in the department were contacted, they were instructed to report all enemy planes down, all enemy prisoners captured, all enemy activity in their respective sectors although these orders already were included in the Standing Operating Procedure for the Department.

SECRET

- 1 -

G-2 Section, Honolulu, Hawaii - Dec 7, 1941

Efforts were begun at about 1800 to secure all still set pictures, both Army and Commercial, and delivery was forwarded to the G-2 of the Army.

Liaison was established with the Navy public relations section about 1030 when it was announced that a radio censorship would be placed in effect immediately. This censorship went into effect about 1130. A radio censorship on the local press and radio also was invoked about this time.

This section advised the War Department of subsequent developments in the radi throughout the morning and early afternoon.

Steps were taken by the section to apprehend all enemy agents and suspicious characters.

Steps were taken to assemble captured maps, papers and equipment for translation, decoding and evaluation.

The two Honolulu radio stations, KGU and KUMB, were cut off the air shortly after 1110 to prevent enemy planes from coming in on the beam. Station KFBC and KOTM in Hilo, Hawaii and Lihue, Kauai, were cut off the air shortly afterwards. Thereafter all radio stations went on the air only for short intervals to broadcast announcements approved by this section dealing with military and civilian defense.

About 1400 the combat intelligence subsection began moving into the forward echelon position in the Alismana Crater. The rear echelon handled combat intelligence from the Headquarters Building, Fort Shafter, then relayed information to the Forward Echelon as they completed their movement into the combat position.

Martial law was announced by General Short at 1545 after a conference between Governor Poindexter, General Short, and the G-2, Colonel Fielder.

General Short announced the blackout at this time, and blackout warnings were broadcast from radio stations at intermittent intervals between this hour and sundown.

A statement was issued at 1600 concerning martial law and the blackout to all press and radio agencies at this time.

Complete blackout of the entire Territory went into effect at sundown, 1800 after warnings by press and radio throughout the Islands.

Throughout the night the entire section functioned from the forward echelon, the rear echelon and the Honolulu Contact Office.

During the second air raid the rear echelon was subjected to falling shell fragments and machine gun fire from American guns shooting at the Japanese planes.

Many messages were handled during the night relative to parachute troops, enemy landings, and sabotage, all were found to be false.

GENERAL REMARKS


Throughout December 7 and 8, known enemy agents and suspect Japanese, German and Italian aliens were apprehended and detained. The Japanese Consul was held incommunicado in his Consulate. The G-2 section coordinated arrangements for internment and examination of those apprehended.

- 2 -
SECRET

G-2 SECTION CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT - Cont'd.
General Remarks - Cont'd.

Efforts were started shortly after the attack on December 7 to reconstruct the enemy tactics of the attack. This involved interrogating dozens of eye witnesses, most of whom told widely differing stories, and the translation and decoding of many maps and papers. These efforts are still in progress and a full report will be made as a separate communication.

Attached hereto is a Work Sheet of Journal in Combat Intelligence Section.


KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

1 Incl: (In dup)
Work Sheet - Journal
7 December 1941 -
(7 sheets)

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 THE ARMY AIR FORCE
 G-2 - PERSONNEL SECTION
 7 DECEMBER 1941

(This report covers the last ten days during which operations were conducted at Fort Rucker, as well as a certain number of messages received by the rear column after the 13th, which messages had set up at (Continued C. F.)

REPORT NO.	TIME	ITEM
M	1000	LT. COL. F. SEXTON, HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE, reported as liaison officer.
P	1002	Road to PEARL HARBOR jammed. Civilian police cannot handle. Military Police notified at 1005.
	1025	Parachute troops landing near BARBERS POINT - at JEROME & CAMEL ROAD.
M	1030	LT. E. D. CHAFFIN, C. W., Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, Schofield Barracks, reported as liaison officer.
I	1032	Troops reporting in direction of Harbor from Schofield. Commence firing.
K	1040	Parachute troops reported at BARBERS POINT. Unverified.
T	1132	Parachute troops have landed on North Shore and have been identified as wearing blue coveralls with red disc on left shoulder. BURGIN. Unverified.
	1135	Parachute troops at WAIKALU HEAD.
	1145	All radio stations were ordered to get off the air, because enemy aircraft were using the beams to come in by. GENERAL MARTIN approved the action.
V	1210	Parachute troops landing at BARBERS POINT. Unverified.
V	1210	Message from manager of KAHUKO PLANTATION: "No Parachute troops have been sighted all morning. Verified by 24th Division G-3.
W	1245	Two local prisoners under guard at FT ARMSTRONG waiting further orders. Also suspicious person reported by civilian.
	1245	Protest Marshal General & Colonel Fielder. GENERAL BULLION told FM General to advise - the President has signed Proclamation and directed that we initiate our Apprehension and Detention Plan.
Z	1300	The Governor will declare Martial Law if the General so desires.
FF	1305	No change in situation for 24th Division. Parachute troops in North Sector are not confirmed.
II	1319	Message reported. Not confirmed.

L. H. B.

- 1 -

7 DECEMBER 1941

SECRET

LAND

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
 Fort Shafter, T. H.
 C.O. of H., 4-2 - FORWARD ECHELON
 7 DECEMBER 1941

WORK SHEET

(These worksheets include the period during which operations were maintained at Fort Shafter, as well as a certain number of messages received by the rear echelon after the forward echelon had set up an advanced C. P.)

<u>MESSAGE NO.</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
OG	1320	Navy reports parachute troops being landed near KANIKOKE, wearing blue coveralls with a red shield. Not verified.
EB	1320	Question re orders to shoot on sight wearers of blue denim. Is being checked. Chief of Staff orders no soldier to wear blue denim.
ED	1330	Landing party reported between BARBERS POINT and KAWAKULI, being fired on by our 2-40's.
DD	1335	One Sampan about to land in front of LUAIKALEI.
	1409	Parachute troops reported by MP's as landing at ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS near WATER TOWER.
MM	1410	Parachute troops near WATER TOWER on ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS. Not verified.
VVV	1510	Teletype being moved from FT SHAFTER 4-2 to CRATER.
TT	1525	Quite a number of parachutists landed in PAUOA VALLEY, by TAFTALUS. No verification.
No time		CAPT. CRUICKSHANK, LT. JUNKER, MR. WILSON, PVT. HOOD & PVT. HAMMOND left FT SHAFTER about 1415 for ALLIAMANU CRATER C.P. Arrived about 1445. One telephone, through Crater switchboard, in operation. LT. COL. T. H. DAVIES arrived at Forward Echelon about 1530.
UU	No time	PVT. DYKIN, 64TH C. A., definitely identified plane as GERMAN HEINKEL 113, with JAPANESE MARKING.
XX	1532	COL. DINGEMAN reports all lights at PEARL HARBOR will be blacked out unless necessary for urgent naval work.
	1535	Five parachute troops landed on ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS wearing blue denim with red marks.
YY	1631	Blackout tonight. BUREIN.
MMM	1825	CAPT. MCGRAW, DIST. ENGINEERS, has rounded up fishermen in KENALO BASIN and was told to report to Provost Marshall.
HHH	1830	COL. BONHAM relieved due to mental condition.
GOG	No time	All saloons closed, no liquor to be sold.
KEE	1845	Blackout announced to DISTRICT COMMANDERS.
9A	1840	Blinker light on RED HILL.
3	1914	Landing of parachute troops proved false.
7	1917	Blinking light.

LAND- 2 -
SECRET

7 DECEMBER 1941

HEADQUARTERS MARINE DEPARTMENT

Fort Shafter, T. H.

A.C. of G-2 - FORWARD ECHOLON

7 DECEMBER 1941

LANDWORK SHEET

(These worksheets include the period during which operations were maintained at Fort Shafter, as well as a certain number of messages received by the rear echelon after the forward echelon had set up an advanced C. P.)

<u>MESSAGE NO.</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
9	1925	Blinker light in West Losh.
18	2048	Blinker light near WATREBU.
25 & 29	2109	Flares over LAHAINA BAY.
31	2131	Above flares sent up by NAVY.
35	2200	Pick-up of enemy aliens progressing satisfactorily.
47	2245	Notice of alert.
46	2250	Landing reported in KAKUA POCKET believed to be from G-2, 24th Division.
48	2300	COLONEL ROW just returned from HILO and reports everything OK at HILO.
50	2303	COLONEL McDONALD to G-2, FA Batteries in HAWAII, EWA PLAIN, MAKAILO, KOLE KOLE. Will fire to register. Will be notified 2 hours previously. Phoned CAPTAIN MARSH, G-2, Rear Echelon, to insert in papers.

LAND

7 DECEMBER 1941

SECRET

NAVAL

U. S. Navy
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.
 A. S. of P., G-2 - BUREAU OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 7 DECEMBER 1941

<u>MESSAGE NO.</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>TEXT</u>
S	1000	Rosay Aircraft Carrier at 153344. BEARD reports no enemy ships in sight. BUREAU.
L	1033	Enemy ships coming in 30 miles S.W. 613.
G	1036	Unknown boat reported at 54 DE 21.
J	1037	Three ships reported previously by radio 30 miles off C 39 are troop ships escorted by enemy planes.
K	1040	3 Surface Vessels approaching BARRERS POINT FROM S.W. about 75 miles off.
Q	1115	Enemy sinker Spal south entering port from BPH.
R	1117	2 IX SE 14 550022. BUREAU.
S	1145	5 inch dud U. S. Naval Shell identified by 24th Division G-2, at Schofield Barracks.
Y	1255	Four Japanese transports off BARRERS POINT. From BPH. Not verified.
KE	1310	Harbor Defense of Pearl Harbor report 1 DE location 54 DE58 moving west, identity unknown. Four Japanese transports off BARRERS POINT. Unverified.
PP	1430	Navy reports unidentified ships firing off UNALUALEI - approaching shore. No confirmation.
QQ	1429	KANSOHE reports having captured document, mark 223 degrees, 90 miles from FORD ISLAND.
KKK	1745	Enemy surface craft reported 20 degrees, 32 minutes - 158 degrees, 16 minutes, course 271 degrees. Possibly a carrier. Sending torpedo aircraft to attack. Not verified.

NAVAL

- 1 -

7 DECEMBER 1941

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
A.C. of S., G-2 - FORWARD ECHELON
7 DECEMBER 1941

A I R

NO.	TIME	ITEM
A	0954	Enemy planes dive bombing and machine gunning HICKAM and WHEELER FIELDS and PEARL HARBOR. WHEELER FIELD in flames. No report of enemy surface ships.
B	None	All planes coming in off GEORGE. Flying low. That is all.
D	1000	Planes coming in northwest of GEORGE. That is all.
	1005	Map and Section Orders found on Jap Pilot who crashed at FT KAY. Will be translated at Contact Office and sent up here.
	1000	One Jap AIRCRAFT CARRIER reported at H344.
		Report from IS HUSSY Enemy ships coming in 30 miles SW -- 038.
	1045	5" Level Shell (dud) identified at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
		Reports indicate about 40 Jap aircraft attacked Oahu early Sunday A. M., apparently from aircraft carrier at H 344.
		Three planes shot down; one at Ordnance Building, FT KAY, one in KAHILANA and one in PEARL HARBOR, near HICKAM FIELD.
	1030	Enemy aircraft over HALEA POINT, flying low.
	1035	Parachute troops near JENSEN & CAMEL RD.
	1040	Scouting planes at KAHILANA.
	1115	Enemy plane reported heading for PEARL HARBOR from south.
	1117	Enemy planes approaching PEARL HARBOR from south.
	1122	Enemy planes approaching PEARL HARBOR from SE south.
	1143	Enemy plane flying low overhead. From HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE.
	1150	Enemy plane shot down by four of our pursuit ships. Report by KAHILANA BARRACKS via WHEELER'S teletype.
	1200	Enemy plane shot down south side of point V KEM.
	1200	One Jap battleship at 34 1/2 SE moving west.
	1200	One enemy reporting trying to land at KAHILANA about 1200.
	1200	Enemy plane shot down at FT BARKETT by small arms fire.
	1200	One enemy dive bomber downed at FT BARKETT by small arms fire. Shot down. Time 1200. Signal WUP.
	1200	Enemy pilot who is being sent here. Information sent for from Contact Office. Later found to be correct.
	1200	Enemy plane shot down at 1130 dropped bomb in CAPITOL. Shot down at 1130. Shot down by 2 feet. From COL. MOSE.

SECRET

BRANCHES SAMAYAN DEPARTMENT

From Captain, T. H.

A.C. of S., G-2 - Forward Section

7 DECEMBER 1941

A I RMESSAGE NO. TIME TEXT

HH 1230 Unidentified station broadcasting on 55-60 meters: "WAILUPE bombed, landing off BARBERS POINT. Naval attacks 90 miles off BARBERS POINT."

ER 1340 DE RUESSY reports our task force No. 1 (4 cruisers, several destroyers headed west off BARBERS POINT), fired on by enemy aircraft. Report unverified.

YFF 1415 Parachute found on BELT ROAD near Japanese plane which crashed and burned, pilot killed. American Navy plane crashed in same vicinity. Pilot and enlisted man both killed.

1420 Two dead aviators - one searched - shot down in PEARL HARBOR YARD.

EK 1420 Airplane approaching from north towards KAHUKU POINT, about 15 miles off. Not identified.

SS 1515 Three enemy planes flying south from SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Signed WING. No confirmation.

AAA 1515 Small carrier based plane, 2 seater (both men dead), one .30 Cal. M. G., carburetor made in Japan, is down at FT KAH and under guard. Guard relieved by COLONEL FIELDER'S orders.

BBB 1640 No activities off KAHUKU up to 5 miles out to sea. One plane over BELLONS FIELD at 15,000 feet. Identity unknown.

1 1649 A large cutter (presumably JAPANESE) is reported at 55 RD 23 by BARRETT GROUP. Small boat going back and forth from boat to shore. Identity unknown.

CCC 1735 BARBERS POINT to KAHUKU 5 miles out, 500 feet, no activity, MAKAPUU to KAHUKU, same.

4 1745 One surface craft (Carrier?) reported at lat 20Degrees, 32 minutes, long. 158 degrees, 16 minutes, course 271. Sending torpedo aircraft to attack.

LLL 1800 Strong radio interference reported by PEARL HARBOR.

11 1928 Enemy dhip using call GEORGE MILE.

35 2104 HICKAM FIELD and PEARL HARBOR being bombed. Six or seven planes without lights; one plane was shot down.

15 2045 Unidentified plane flying toward PEARL HARBOR (low).

16 2059 Unidentified flight coming in.

1 2101 HICKAM being bombed.

21 2102 HICKAM & PEARL HARBOR being bombed.

19 2110 HICKAM attacked. Not confirmed.

20 2112 PEARL HARBOR attacked. Not confirmed.

26 & 30 2113 Above are our own planes taking to land.

A I R**SECRET**

7 December, 1941

HEADQUARTERS ISMAILIAN DEPARTMENT
 Fort Shafter, T. H.
 A.C. of S., G-2 - FORWARD ECHELON
 7 DECEMBER 1941

A I R

<u>MESSAGE NO.</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
	2150	Bridge near gun position of 6TH FA ^{marked} worked with phosphorons -which was obliterated with mud by gun crew.
	2150	64TH FA Bn reports PEARL HARBOR receiving naval bombardment.
43	2205	Seven planes reported trying to land at ALA MOANA and are being fired on.
	2300	No attack on Australian area; one Battalion of Australian Imperial Forces enroute to Kaiphong.
51	2322	COLONEL DINGEMAN (Liaison PEARL HARBOR - to LT. BURR USN, Liaison FORWARD ECHELON). - MIDWAY being attacked by ships 12 miles south and west of reef at 0940.
	2350	At MIDWAY, no actual bombing, but guns went into action - indicating planes in close. Being shelled. 24 direct hits.
	2350	Unidentified ship in area.

A I R

SECRET

7 DECEMBER, 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

Forward Echelon,
20 December 1941

Subject: Operations Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.

To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Herewith report covering conduct of operations of troops of this command during the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

a. Troops of the Hawaiian Department and outlying islands went on alert status under Alert No. 1 between 1500 and 1515 on November 27, 1941, on secret information from the War Department. Notification of enemy air attack on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field was received at about 0810. Major Echelon Commanders and District Commanders were notified of the enemy air operations and ordered to function immediately under Alert No. 3, SOP HD, 5 November 1941. Beginning at about 0900, 7 December 1941, initial defense positions were occupied. The operations section moved to the Forward Command Post at 1000.

b. HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE: Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Bellows Field were attacked by Japanese aircraft about 0755, 7 December 1941. The first attack was by dive bombers on the hangars, aircraft, barracks, Hawaiian Air Depot and Engineering Shops. The second attack at about 0850, preceded by heavy ground strafing against aircraft and antiaircraft defenses. The end of attack was at about 0950. The Hawaiian Air Force automatically turned over 18th Bombardment Wing to Naval control per Joint Army - Navy Agreement. At 0800 all Air Warning Service personnel were ordered to Air Warning Service Information Center. Serviceable pursuit aircraft were retrieved and took off at about 0850. Four A-20's and two B-17's were immediately salvaged, manned and took off at about 1140 under Navy control. Orders were issued at once to put all available aircraft in commission.


c. HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND: All troops were alerted at 0810 and took up positions under Field Order No. 1, Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, except as follows: Battery "A," 41st Coast Artillery and Battery "B," 41st Coast Artillery in position at Fort Kamehameha. Battery Hawkins, two 3-inch sea coast guns, Fort Kamehameha, manned by Headquarters Battery, 15th Coast Artillery. Interceptor Command assumed operational command of 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA). Operations during the period of the raid as follows: Enemy planes attacking over Fort Kamehameha at 0800, 1000, and 1120 taken under fire by automatic weapons of Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor and 53d Coast Artillery Brigade units at Fort Kamehameha. At least one plane was brought down. Casualties: Killed, three; wounded, fifteen. No materiel damaged.

d. 24th INFANTRY DIVISION: Enemy air attack came at approximately 0810, 7 December 1941. Machine gun squads, automatic rifle and riflemen from the 19th and 21st Infantry quickly returned

fire of attacking planes. Initial 024D41 field positions occupied commencing at 0830, 7 December 1941. All units were in position and ready to operate under Alert No. 3 with initial issue of ammunition at 1700, except 240mm Howitzer batteries. 240mm batteries ready to fire at 1235, 8 December 1941. Other action during the period consisted of increasing number and strength of standing guards and patrols, already operating on anti-sabotage missions at the beginning of the period, and investigating false reports of enemy landing action in this Division's Sector. All units ordered to intensify fortification projects. Front line units were in position at 1100.

a. 25th INFANTRY DIVISION: At the time of the raid, this Division was functioning under Alert No. 1, in the patrolling of the Command and Fire Control Cable System and the guarding of vital installations in its assigned sector. At 0830 the Division Commander directed the drawing of all alert ammunition. At 0900 Alert No. 3 was placed in effect. At 0960 the Division departed for defense positions. Troops already in the field immediately increased the strength of anti-sabotage guards on the most vital installations and placed additional posts on secondary installations. 25th Infantry Division Journal records Wheeler Field bombed at 0800; at 0825 troops with small arms and antiaircraft machine guns fired on enemy aircraft; at 0830 the 25th Division Artillery was ordered to draw their initial issue of Field Artillery ammunition; at 0845 a second air raid of about forty enemy planes is reported; at 0900 orders received to occupy war positions maintaining two hundred yards between trucks.

- 1015 - 27th Infantry troops clear Schofield Barracks for John Rodgers Air Port.
- 1040 - Water tank of 25th Medical Battalion sent to Hickam Field Hospital. No water available at Hickam Field.
- 1108 - Remainder of 298th Infantry cleared Schofield Barracks for Bellows Field area (one battalion on duty that area since 27 November 1941).
- 1118 - Units of 35th Infantry in war positions, Ewa Sector.
- 1130 - 25th Infantry Bands take over guard duty at Schofield Barracks.
- 1310 - Firing Batteries of 25th Division Artillery enroute to war positions with one-half unit of fire.
- 1345 - Engineer supplies, consisting of 30,000 sand bags, barbed wire and pickets, etc., made available to each Infantry Regiment and Artillery Battalion by Division Commander.
- 1600 - 25th Division Artillery Command Post closed at Schofield Barracks and opened at Forward Command Post. All troops in war positions with at least one unit of fire all types of ammunition, except 240mm Howitzers. Ammunition supply built up during the night to two units of fire. The 25th Division cleared the Post of Schofield Barracks a half hour ahead of calculated schedule.


WILLIAM B. DONEGAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

2 Incls:

- #1 - Report Hawaiian Interceptor Commander
- #2 - Report Base Operations, Hickam Field, T. H.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND

18 December 1941.

Subject: Report of Enemy Activity over Oahu, 7 December 1941.

To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

At approximately 0802, a large formation of enemy airplanes were heard approaching Wheeler Field from the North at approximately 5000 feet. They peeled off and attacked the hangar line with Dive Bombers, releasing in all about thirty five bombs - of these, approximately four were 600 lbs; about three were 250 lbs; about eight were 100 lbs; the remainder were smaller and some appeared to be oil or other type of incendiary bombs. The airplanes appeared to release their bombs from an altitude of from 500 to 1000 feet. There were two types of bombers in the attack - one with non-retractable wheels appeared to be of the A-17 type, and the others were a little faster and had retractable wheels. Each type had a crew of two.

Bombs struck and burned Hangar No. 1 where the Base Engineering was situated and Hangar No. 3. They also burned a building used as a store house by the Post Exchange and a mobilization-type warehouse filled with cement. One bomb struck the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks on the Southwest corner entering a window on the second floor where it exploded causing considerable damage to personnel and rendering the building unserviceable. One bomb which landed in the open made a crater approximately 15 feet in diameter and six feet deep.

After the airplanes had expended their bombs, they came to a very low altitude and machine-gunned the airplanes parked in front of the hangars. They also fired bullets through the windows of buildings, attempting to set them afire with incendiary ammunition. From belts of ammunition in one of the captured planes, it was noted that the ammunition was loaded two armor-piercing, one tracer; two armor-piercing, one tracer; two armor-piercing, one incendiary. The bullets punctured the gasoline tanks of the airplanes and set them afire with tracer and incendiary ammunition. This method of attack was very successful and destroyed fifty four airplanes by fire and twenty nine airplanes by other means. After the first raid, the personnel at the post were employed in pulling away unburned airplanes from those that were burning and removing as many as possible from the burning hangars. They were also employed in fighting the numerous fires caused by the raid and in rescuing the wounded.

Before the raid, all airplanes were tied down on the ramp in front of the hangars or were inside the hangars. None of them were loaded with ammunition. After they had been rescued from the fire and rolled away from the hangar line, the crews began arming them.

Encl 4 3'

18

P-2, Letr, Enemy Activity-Oahu, 7 Dec 41, fr CGHIC to CGHAF, 18 Dec 41

At approximately 0910, a second attack was made by seven airplanes, but little damage was done. These airplanes appeared to be expending on Wheeler Field what ammunition was left after the raid on Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor.

The following members of the 46th Pursuit Squadron took off from Wheeler Field about 0850 and were ordered by the Controller at the Information Center to proceed to the vicinity of Diamond Head at 8000 feet:

1st Lieut. L. M. SAUNDERS
2d Lieut. J. M. THACKER
2d Lieut. G. - STERLING
2d Lieut. P. - RASMUSSEN

They proceeded to the vicinity of Bellows Field and there attacked a formation of nine Japanese two-seater airplanes with retractable landing gears. Lieut. Saunders and Lieut. Rasmussen each shot down a Japanese airplane and Lieut. Sterling was shot down by the enemy. Lieut. Saunders reports that the Japanese two-seater airplanes could out-climb the P-36 airplanes used by the 46th Pursuit Squadron. By about 0920, 1st Lieut. M. A. Moore and 2d Lieut. O. Norris of the 46th Pursuit Squadron got into the air. Lt. Moore fired at a Japanese airplane without result.

The 47th Pursuit Squadron was located at Haleiwa and, between 0815 and 1000, made two flights. In the first flight were 2d Lieut. Kenneth Taylor, 2d Lieut. George Welch, 1st Lieut. John Webster, 2d Lieut. John Daines, each flying P-40's and 1st Lieut. Robert Rogers in a P-36. In the second flight were 1st Lieut. Robert Rogers, 2d Lieut. George Welch, 2d Lieut. Kenneth Taylor and 2d Lieut. Harry Brown in P-40's and 2d Lieut. John Daines in a P-36. Lieut. Welch shot down two Japanese planes in the first flight and two during the second flight. Lieut. Taylor shot down two Japanese planes during the first flight. Lieut. Brown shot down one Japanese plane during the second flight. Lieut. Daines was shot down at approximately 0915 over Schofield Barracks, probably by our own anti-aircraft troops.

The 44th Pursuit Squadron was on Detached Service at Bellows Field for Gunnery Training. Upon being notified of the attack at Wheeler Field, the crews began arming the airplanes. In an effort to take off under heavy fire from the enemy, Lieut. Whiteman was shot down immediately after take-off, Lieut. Hans C. Christensen was killed while getting into a P-40 to take-off. Lieut. Samuel F. Bishop took off and was shot down into the ocean. Although wounded in the leg, this pilot swam ashore.

The following casualties were incurred at Wheeler Field, excepting officers who were killed in flight:

38 Enlisted Men Killed,
59 Enlisted Men Wounded.

These casualties were suffered mostly by the men sleeping in the tents and those sleeping in the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks that was hit by a bomb.

The Information Center for the Interceptor Command which had been set up in a temporary installation near Fort Shafter was operated as follows on 7 December 1941:

(a) 0400 - 0700

- (1) All six detector stations operating per orders C/8, HED. 9
(2) 1st Lieut. KERMIT A. TYLER, AC, was Watch Officer.

P-3, Ltr, Enemy Activity-Oahu, 7 Dec 41, fr CGHIC to CGHAF, 18 Dec 41 -

- (3) A plotting detail consisting of one NCO and 10 enlisted men was on duty.
- (4) The Control Center at Wheeler Field was manned by Sgt Starry.

(b) 0700

- (1) All detector stations closed down except one, the Cpana Station at Kahuku Point, which remained in operation in order to continue training a new man operating the oscilloscope. This Station picked up plot at C702 indicating airplanes at 136 miles bearing 0° to 3° and kept tracking the target.
- (2) Lieut. Tyler continued as Watch Officer as his schedule stipulated that he remain on duty until C800.

(c) 0720

- (1) The Cpana Station called to inform the Information Center switchboard operator that they were plotting a large group of airplanes. In view of contemplated arrival of B-17's from the mainland and probability of Naval aircraft operating, the Watch Officer did not consider it necessary to take any action.

(d) 0800

- (1) Attack underway and all AWS personnel were called to duty.

(e) 0820

- (1) Lieut. Grover C. White, Signal Corps, Communications Officer, and Master Sergeant Harold Taylor, Information Center Chief, arrived.

(f) 0830

- (1) Major Lorry N. Tindal, Air Corps, arrived and took over the duties of Controller.

(g) 0920

- (1) 1st Lieut. Edwin R. Granberry, CAC, arrived and manned AA position.

(h) 0940

- (1) 1st Lieut. A. A. Konkol, SC & Captain N. L. Tittle, SC, arrived.

(i) 0945

- (1) 2d Lieut. V. A. Harril, CAC, arrived at AA position.

(j) 1015

- (1) Major E. P. Bergquist, Air Corps, arrived.

P-4, Ltr, Enemy Activity - Oahu, 7 Dec 41, fr CGHIC to CGHAF, 18 Dec 41 -

(k) 1030

(1) Lt Comdr W.E.G. Taylor, arrived.

(1) After 0800

Since 0800 the Station has remained in continuous operation.

The following is a recapitulation of the airplanes at Wheeler Field as of 9 December 1941:

Type	Stock Record	In Commission	Repairable Locally	Repair Upon Receipt of Major Assembly	Fire	Destroyed Other Causes
P-40B	88	25	9	5	36	13
P-40C	13	2	4	0	4	3
P-36A	39	24	2	2	5	6
P-26A	8	2	0	0	4	2
P-26B	6	3	1	0	2	0
C-47B	1	1	0	0	0	0
A-12A	4	1	0	0	0	3
B-12A	3	2	1	0	0	0
B-18	1	1	0	0	0	0
OA-8	1	0	1	0	0	0
OA-9	3	1	0	0	2	0
AT-6	4	0	1	0	1	2

H. C. Davidson
 H. C. DAVIDSON,
 Brigadier General, Air Corps,
 Commanding.

- 4 -
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HICKAM FIELD
Office of the Post Operations Officer
Hickam Field, T.H.

19 December 1941

SUBJECT: Report on Tactics Used in Bombing Attack of 7 December 1941.

TO : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fordward Echelon, T.H.

1. The following observations are reported in connection with the Japanese bombing attack on 7 December 1941.

a. I was in the Post Operations Office at Hickam Field waiting for the arrival of twelve (12) incoming B-17s. Shortly before the attack, I noticed the time to be 0745. I would estimate the attack occurred within ten (10) minutes.

b. The Hawaiian Air Depot repair hangar was dive bombed first, and the hangars on the roadside immediately thereafter. These attacks were pressed home to a very low altitude.

c. The airplanes parked on the mat were strafed after the dive bombing of the hangars. Several planes were set afire. I noted a bright red flame on the ground under an airplane parked next to Hangar 6. I am unable to state whether this was an incendiary bomb or an airplane flare. The planes were the same type in some cases. I would say that the dive bombers were also used for strafing.

d. The hangars and planes were also strafed by planes flying perpendicular to the hangar line. This action followed the strafing attack in c, which was parallel to the line.

e. All strafing attacks came very close to the ground and ceased only when almost on top of the objectives.

f. There was a short lull (about thirty (30) minutes) between the first and second attacks. During the second attack, my attention was concentrated on a high altitude attack by a formation of about twelve (12) planes which flew in from the south in a very tight formation. From the approach, which was directly along the hangars on the mat side, I would say that this attack was intended for the hangar line, although it hit the area just west of the hangar line (barracks, parade ground, etc.,). I believe this group of bombs was over and to the left of the intended targets.

g. The second attack was accompanied by strafing, although it seemed less severe than during the first attack.

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Report on Bombing Attack. Cont'd

h. Immediately after the high altitude attack, I observed a heavy dive bombing attack on the Pearl Harbor area. This was pressed home against an intense anti-aircraft fire, although I saw no planes shot down. The bombers in this attack did not come as low as those which conducted the attack in b above.

i. I observed only single engine planes.

j. I saw no enemy planes actually fall, although I observed two (2) which were smoking and appeared to be in trouble.

k. The attacks were finished about 0915 - 0930.

Gordon A. Blake
GORDON A. BLAKE,
Major, Air Corps,
Post Operations Officer.

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